Bidders' values in discriminatory and uniform-price auctions are not point-identified 
Introduction
In a multi-unit auction, multiple identical objects are bought, sold, or traded. Applications are wide-ranging and well-studied, e.g. sales auctions of Treasury bonds, quota rights, and IPOs; procurement auctions of electricity; and double auction trading in stock markets and online business-to-business exchanges.
Unfortunately, the theory of multi-unit auctions still lags far behind the theory of singleobject auctions, with implications for empirical research. The theory of single-object auctions shows that, under fairly mild assumptions, the distribution of bidder values is point-identified from the distribution of bids. Consequently, an econometrician who can confidently estimate the distribution of bids in a given auction can confidently infer the distribution of bidder values in that auction, under the hypothesis of equilibrium bidding. On the other hand, in multi-unit auctions such as discriminatory and uniform-price auctions, theory provides very little guidance on how to interpret data generated in equilibrium, even in the important special case when bidders have independent private values (IPV). This paper seeks to fill this hole in the literature. First, I show that the distribution of bidder values is not point-identified from the distribution of bids under the assumption of equilibrium bidding and (asymmetric) IPV. However, if one is willing to impose the additional assumption that bidders have non-increasing marginal values (NIMV), I provide upper and lower bounds on the distribution of bidder values that can be inferred from the distribution of bids in both discriminatory and uniform-price auctions. NIMV is a very natural assumption in some settings. For instance, Chapman, McAdams, and Paarsch (2006) (CMP) argue that banks who bid in the Bank of Canada's short-term cash reserve auctions exhibit NIMV since any cash acquired through the auction will be put to its highest-value use, and since there are no fixed costs associated with deploying cash acquired through the auction.
The second main contribution of the paper is to provide testable implications of the hypothesis that bidder i's strategy is a best response to the distribution of others' bids, under the assumptions that bidders have IPV and bidder i has NIMV. (Each bidder's strategy can be tested separately, regardless of whether other players' strategies are best responses.)
These testable implications leverage the fact that more than one unit is sold and have no analogue in single-object auction theory.
The introduction continues with a discussion of some related literature. The bulk of the paper then focuses on the discriminatory auction: Section 2 presents a model of the discriminatory auction; Section 3 develops partial identification results; and Section 4 provides a novel set of testable restrictions of the equilibrium hypothesis. Section 5 then extends these results to the uniform-price auction. Section 6 provides an example in which this paper's identification results are used to conduct a hypothetical policy counter-factual in the uniform-price auction. (For a policy counter-factual analysis in the discriminatory auction using this paper's results, see Hortacsu and McAdams (2007) .) Section 7 concludes. Proofs of more technical results are in the Appendix.
Related literature. This paper builds upon the extensive literature on non-parametric identification in single-object auctions, especially Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) (GPV) .
(See Athey and Haile (2005) for a comprehensive survey.) GPV pioneered the non-parametric approach of using the first-order conditions of optimal bidding to identify the distribution of bidder values from the distribution of equilibrium bids. In this paper, I exploit such firstorder conditions to bound bidders' values and to generate testable restrictions. However, the problem of identification is more difficult in multi-unit auctions than in single-object auctions, since a "bid" in an auction of S identical units is an S-dimensional demand schedule, while a "value" is an S-dimensional marginal value schedule. Furthermore, there may be many different marginal value schedules that can rationalize a given bid as a best response.
This creates a challenge for identification since, even absent estimation error, an econometrician cannot infer the true distribution of bidder values from the assumption of equilibrium play. My response to this challenge is to focus on the more modest goal of bounding bidder values. This paper therefore relates to the growing literature on partially identified (or "setidentified") models of games. See e.g. Manski (1995) and, in the context of auctions, Haile and Tamer (2003) .
The methodology developed here has been applied recently in Chapman, McAdams and Paarsch (2007) and Hortacsu and McAdams (2007) . Also closely related are Hortacsu (2002) and Kastl (2005) , who take a non-parametric approach to bound bidder values in discriminatory and uniform-price auctions, respectively.
1 However, neither Hortacsu nor Kastl exploit all of the restrictions imposed on values by the first-order necessary conditions of optimal bidding. Consequently, their bounds are looser than those developed here, weakening any policy conclusions derived from them.
This paper also provides a novel set of testable restrictions of the equilibrium hypothesis in multi-unit auctions. In related work, Kastl (2005) explores the fact that some observed bids in uniform-price auctions cannot be rationalized as best responses. He proposes a model in which bidders incur what I shall call a "complexity cost" when submitting (step-function) bids having more steps, and finds that bidding behavior in his application appears consistent with small, non-zero complexity costs. This paper is complementary to Kastl (2005) , since it provides a way to test his model of equilibrium bidding with complexity costs as well as the standard model of equilibrium bidding without such costs. If future research using these 1 Kang and Puller (2007) follows Hortacsu (2002) , but imposes an additional restriction that each bidder has the same marginal value for all quantities for which he bids the same price. For a parametric structural analysis, see Fevrier, Preget, and Visser (2004) .
tests rejects complexity costs as an explanation of bidding behavior, -best response as in Chapman, McAdams, and Paarsch (2006) refers to a typical realization of his value. Similar notation is also used for bids, etc.)
Assumption 1: Bidders have independent private values (IPV), where the distribution of (ṽ 1 , ...,ṽ n ) is common knowledge among the bidders but unknown to the econometrician.
Auction Rules. Permissible bids. Each bidder submits a bid
that b i,q ≥ b i,q for all q < q . Let B be the set of all such permissible bids. 4 As shorthand, let b I denote a profile of bids made by bidders in the set I ⊂ {1, ..., N }, and let b x I be the 2 Especially in uniform-price auctions, one would expect any best response to utilize the maximal number of steps permitted by the auction rules. However, this is rarely the case. In the uniform-price Czech Treasury auctions studied in Kastl (2005) 's Czech Treasury auctions, bidders could make bids having up to ten steps, but no one ever used more than nine. Similarly, in the uniform-price electricity procurement auctions studied by Hortacsu and Puller (2007) , "only one firm ever used the maximum number of steps, and that only occurred once for that firm". (Private communication with Steven Puller.) 3 As in McAdams (2006) , the analysis can be adapted to procurement auctions and double auctions by allowing for non-zero bidder endowments. 4 In many applications, bidders are restricted to submitting bids having at most K steps, where K < S.
That is, there can exist at most K − 1 quantities q ∈ {1, ..., S − 1} such that b i,q > b i,q+1 . Adapting the analysis to the case with a limited number of steps is straightforward and omitted to save space.
x-th highest unit-bid made by any bidder in I, with shorthand b x {1,...,N } ≡ b x for the x-th highest unit-bid overall. Allocation rule. Quantity is allocated by market-clearing, i.e. the highest S unit-bids win. Lets i,q ≡b
denote bidder i's residual inverse supply, the competing unit-bid that bidder i views as random and must beat to win a q-th unit of the good. Assumption 2 below rules out the possibility of ties, in which case b i,q is one of the highest S unit-bids iff b i,q > s i,q . 5 Payment rule. In the discriminatory auction, bidder i pays the sum of his unit-bids on what he wins.
Definition 1 (Winning probability). w i,q (x) = Pr(x >s i,q ) is the probability that bidder i wins at least quantity q when bidding price x for a q-th unit.
Assumption 2: For each bidder i and each b i ∈ supp(b i ) in the support of his bidding strategy, his winning probability w i,q (·) is continuously differentiable at b i,q for all q.
Payoffs. Bidder i's interim expected payoff in the discriminatory auction takes the form
depends on others' strategies only through the distribution of bidder i's residual inverse supply for quantity q. Assumption 2 implies that the following derivatives are well-defined and continuous in b i,q :
Gaps Say that bidder i faces a "gap" at price p for quantity q if w i,q (p) = 0 and w i,q (p) > 0.
Bidding in a gap is never a best response in the first-price auction since a bidder can, on the margin, lower his payments without lowering his probability of winning by bidding slightly less. However, in discriminatory auctions of two or more units, a bidder's best response may well be to bid in a gap for some quantities. (Bidding in gaps arises even more naturally in uniform-price auctions, since some winning bids never set the price.)
Example 1. Two bidders participate in a discriminatory auction of two objects. Bidder 2's bid takes the formb 2 = (2x, x), where x ∼ U [0, 1]. Thus, bidder 1's residual supply has the
To win a first unit for certain, bidder 1 only needs to bid one on that unit. To have more than a 50% chance of winning a second unit, however, bidder 1 must bid more than one on both units. Consequently, when bidder 1's marginal value for the second unit is high enough, his best response will be to bid more than one on the first unit. For example, when bidder 1 has value v 1 = (3.5, 3.5), his (unique) best response is to bid (1.5, 1.5), in which case his first unit-bid is in a gap.
In this version of the paper, I focus for simplicity on the special case in which all observed bids are not in gaps, as guaranteed by Assumption 3 below. However, bidding in gaps can and does occur in practice. For a more thorough treatment of gaps, see the working-paper version of the paper.
, and q.
Partial identification in discriminatory auctions
How much can be inferred about the unobserved distribution of bidder valuesṽ = (ṽ 1 , ...,ṽ N ) from a given distribution of bidsb = (b 1 , ...,b N ) in the discriminatory auction, given that those bids arise in equilibrium? To focus on this identification question, this section abstracts from issues associated with estimating the distribution ofb.
Definition 2. The distribution of valuesṽ rationalizes a given distribution of bidsb if, when values are distributed asṽ, there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium profile of (possibly mixed) strategies σ = (σ 1 , ..., σ n ) such that σ(ṽ) is distributed asb.
For each bidder i and permissible bid b i ∈ B, define Fact. The distribution of valuesṽ rationalizes the distribution of bidsb iffṽ ∈ Co({ψ(b) :
where Co(X) denotes the convex hull of X.
(b i ) can be difficult in practice. For each possible v i ∈ R S , one must solve a challenging multi-dimensional constrained optimization problem to determine whether b i is a best response given value v i . To make further progress, consider the larger set of values that satisfy all "first-order conditions" associated with bid b i :
These first-order conditions impose a set of necessary conditions that any distribution of values must satisfy to rationalize a given distribution of bids.
Fact. The distribution of valuesṽ rationalizes the distribution of bidsb only ifṽ ∈ Co{ψ(b) :
First-order conditions of optimal bidding
Fix a bidder i and fix a bid b i in the support of his equilibrium distribution of bidsb i . This
Definition 3 (Indifference levels). For every X ⊂ {1, ..., S}, let v * i,X (b i ) be the "indifference level of marginal values" such that bidder i is indifferent on the margin between raising or lowering his unit-bids on all quantities in X when his marginal value equals v * i,X (b i ) on all quantities in X, implicitly defined by
Note from (1) that
for all individual quantities q = 1, ..., S.
, bidder i is indifferent on the margin between raising or lowering his q-th unit-bid. Consequently, when v i,q = v * i,q (b i ) for all q, bidder i is indifferent on the margin to all local deviations, so that all of the first-order conditions of optimal bidding are trivially satisfied. Indeed, when just one object is sold (S = 1), v * i,1 (b i ) is the only marginal value given which bidder i does not strictly prefer on the margin to raise or lower his bid.
Thus, the first-price auction with independent private values is point-identified by the firstorder conditions of optimal bidding (Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) ). Similarly, in
is the only marginal value schedule that can rationalize bidder i's bid schedule b i if that bid schedule is strictly decreasing in quantity. On the other hand, if bidder i has bid the same price for several units, many different marginal value schedules can potentially rationalize his bid as a best response.
Example 2. Two bidders with independent private values submit equilibrium bids in a discriminatory auction of two objects. Bidder 2's bid takes the formb 2 = (x, x), where
Thus, bidder 1's residual inverse supply for each quantity has the property
). Suppose that bidder 1 is observed submitting the bid (1/2, 1/2). What marginal value schedules could rationalize this bid as a best response? Note from (7) that v * 1,1 (b 1 ) = 2b 1,1 and v * 1,2 (b 1 ) = 2b 1,2 . Thus, by Theorem
In particular, when bidder 1 submits the bid (1/2, 1/2), there is no way to rule out the possibility that (i) he has constant marginal values (v 1,1 = v 1,2 = 1), (ii) he has no value for one unit without a second unit (v 1,1 = 0 and v 1,2 = 2), or (iii) he faces a fixed cost of consumption that exceeds the marginal consumption value of the first unit (v 1,1 < 0 and v 1,2 = 2 − v 1,1 ).
Tight bounds under non-increasing marginal values
This section provides tight upper and lower bounds on marginal values in V
is willing to assume that bidder i's marginal values are non-increasing in quantity.
Definition 4 (NIMV). Bidder i has non-increasing marginal values (NIMV) if
S be the set of non-increasing marginal value schedules.
Definition 5 (Steps). For each bid-level b, let Q(b) = {q ∈ {1, ..., S} : b i,q = b} be the (possibly empty) "step" of quantities that have been bid at that price. Note
Theorem 2. For each bid b i and quantity q, there exists bounds
and v i,q = v i,q . In particular, these bounds are
Discussion of Theorem 2(a). Consider whether bidder i has an incentive on the margin to deviate by slightly raising his price on all quantities in the range [min Q(b i,q ), q] ("upward deviation at q"). Since bidder i has non-increasing marginal values, his marginal value on all quantities in this range is bounded below by his marginal value on quantity q. In
bidder i must strictly prefer the upward deviation at q, a contradiction of the hypothesis that bid b i is a best response. This explains why, for all
bidder i must strictly prefer to deviate by slightly lowering his price on all quantities in the range [q , max Q(b i,q )] ("downward deviation at q "). See Figure 1 for a stylized illustration of the upward deviation at q and downward deviation at q . (In the figure, q, q belong to the same step, so that
for all q and, similarly, why
Less easy to explain in words is the fact that v i,q is bounded above by min x≤qv * i,x (b i ) and
Figure 1: Upward deviation at quantity q and downward deviation at quantity q .
bounded below by max x≥qv * i,x (b i ) for all q. Intuitively, these conditions reflect a relationship between the least upper bound on bidder i's marginal value on quantity q and the greatest lower bound on his marginal value on quantity q + 1. Namely, these marginal values are mutually constraining, because bidder i must not have any incentive to raise or lower his price on all quantities in the range Q(b i,q )∪Q(b i,q+1 ). Lemma 2 highlights one consequence of this connection between the upper and lower bounds on bidder i's marginal values. Namely, Lemma 2 allows one to compute the lower bounds directly from the upper bounds, and vice versa.
Figure 2 illustrates some of the general features of the marginal value intervals
(The bid b i is traced by filled dots; it has two steps, Q($2) = {1, 2, 3} and Q($1) = {4, 5}.) 
Testable restrictions in discriminatory auctions
In Section 3, I derived necessary conditions on bidder values for a given bid to be a best response with respect to a given distribution of others' bids, assuming non-increasing marginal values (NIMV). Here, I derive necessary conditions on the distribution of others' bids for a given bid to be a best response for any non-increasing marginal value schedule. In particular, for each bidder i and each bid b i ∈ supp(b i ), I provide a set of novel testable restrictions imposed by the joint hypothesis that (a) this bid was a best response and (b) bidder i had NIMV when he made this bid. 6 If one is willing to assume NIMV, these restrictions can be used to test the best response hypothesis on a bidder-by-bidder (and bid-by-bid) basis; for an example, see Chapman, McAdams, and Paarsch (2006) . On the other hand, if one is willing to assume equilibrium bidding, these restrictions can be used to test the non-increasing marginal values hypothesis; for an example, see Section 6.
Throughout this section, consider a fixed bidder i and a fixed bid b i ∈ supp(b i ). Before I proceed, some definitions are needed. 
For the bid b i to be a best response, all feasible deviations must be unprofitable. In particular, for every pair of quantities q 1 ≤ q 2 and every small enough ∆, the upward deviation at q 1 by ∆ and the downward deviation at q 2 by ∆ must both be unprofitable.
By (1), the incremental profit from these deviations takes the form
Taking ∆ → 0 yields necessary conditions for b i to be a best response:
Note that, since bidder i has non-increasing marginal values (NIMV),
for all x 1 ≤ q 1 and x 2 ≥ q 2 . Also note that, by definition of the steps Q(b i,q 1 ) and
re-arranging, (15,16) imply an inequality condition on the distribution of bids that does not depend on bidder values.
Theorem 3 and its Corollary are immediate consequences of (17). bids is such that, for every pair of quantities q 1 ≤ q 2 ,
Corollary. Bid b i can only be a best response for bidder i if the distribution of others' bids is such that, for every pair of quantities
Discussion: adapting Theorem 3 to settings with "complexity cost". How should we interpret the failure of one or more of the conditions (18)? One approach, due to Kastl (2005) , is to consider an alternative model in which bidders incur some additional cost when submitting a bid having more steps. We can test such a model using this paper's approach, by restricting attention to feasible deviations that do not increase the number of steps. In particular, consider any q 1 ≤ q 2 such that 1 ∈ Q(b i,q 1 ) and S ∈ Q(b i,q 2 ). in the derivation of (17), the fact that these two deviations must be unprofitable, combined with the assumption that bidders have non-increasing marginal values, implies the following inequality restriction on the distribution of bids:
Discussion: implementing a test based on a single restriction of the form (19).
Suppose that an econometrician does not know the true distribution of bids but observes a 7 The condition 1 ∈ Q(b i,q1 ) means that quantity q 1 is not in the first step in bid b i , while S ∈ Q(b i,q2 ) means that q 2 is not in the last step. In particular, since q 1 ≤ q 2 , such a pair of quantities can only exist if bid b i has at least three steps. I suspect that any bid having less than three steps can be rationalized as a best response given some non-increasing marginal values and large enough complexity costs.
sample of M discriminatory auctions in which the same bidders have independent private values drawn from the same distribution and play the same equilibrium strategies in each auction. 8 (The econometrician observes all bids in each auction, with bidder identities.)
The hazard rate in (19) can be difficult to estimate in practice, so consider the discretized version of this restriction (derived in the same way as (17)):
Testing this inequality requires that one estimate the probabilities of four events, corresponding to whether bidder i's residual inverse supply for quantity q 1 is less than b or in (b, b + ∆) and whether his residual inverse supply for quantity q 2 is less than b − ∆ or in (b − ∆, b).
Complicating matters is that these events are not disjoint, e.g.s i,q 2 < b − ∆ implies that s i,q 1 < b since residual inverse supply is non-decreasing.
Consider the following partition of the space of all possible realized residual inverse supply curves s i into five disjoint sets: (i) s i ∈ "HH" if s i,q 1 > b + ∆ and
and "L" are mnemonic for "high", "middle", and "low".) Every realized residual supply curve (up to a zero-measure set) must belong to one of these five sets since it must be nondecreasing in quantity. Figure 3 illustrates an idealized curve belonging to each of the five sets.
Let r HH , ..., r LL denote the true probabilities of these events. Note that w i,q 1 (b + ∆) = or, after re-arranging,
Evaluating (DISCRIM-(q 1 , q 2 )) given a sample of M identical auctions is equivalent to a standard problem of testing a moment inequality involving multinomial probabilities given M iid draws from the relevant multinomial distribution. Namely, letr M HH , ...,r M LL be the empirical probability of each of the five events, and
) is asymptotically normal with variance that can also be consistently estimated by standard methods. (See Lehmann and Casella (1998), pp 106, 193-194.) Discussion: implementing a test based on multiple restrictions of the form (18).
Any subset of the S(S − 1)/2 inequality restrictions (18) can (when discretized as in (21)) be translated into an equivalent set of moment inequalities similar to (DISCRIM-(q 1 , q 2 )), but a joint test of such conditions is complicated by the fact that the moments are correlated.
Any joint test must therefore correct for the possibility that one or more of these inequalities may appear to be violated because of sampling error, even when all such restrictions are truly satisfied.
The simplest and most conservative approach would be to employ the Bonferroni correction, in which the joint hypothesis is rejected iff any of the individual hypotheses can be rejected with sufficient confidence. 9 (See e.g. Miller (1981) .) Since the confidence threshold for any individual test under this correction becomes more stringent as the number of tests increases, it may be sensible to choose a priori a subset of all pairs of quantities (q 1 , q 2 ) and test the moment inequalities just for those pairs. For example, Chapman, McAdams, and
Paarsch (2006) only consider pairs (q 1 , q 2 ) such that q 1 = q 2 .
Extension: uniform-price auctions
Our analysis of the discriminatory auction in Sections 2-4 applies with very little modification to the uniform-price auction. Here I highlight the few details that differ.
Model. For concreteness, consider the uniform (S +1)-st price auction (or simply "uniform price auction'"). 10 The model is identical to that of Section 2, except that bidder i pays the (S + 1)-st highest unit-bidb S+1 rather than his own unit-bid b i,q for each quantity q when he wins that unit. Consequently, payoffs take the form
9 A more satisfying -though much more computationally-intensive -approach would be to compute maximum likelihood estimates of the relevant multinomial probabilities, with and without the moment inequality constraints, and compare likelihoods. 10 The analysis can easily be adapted to other uniform-price auctions, such as the S-th price auction (price equals lowest winning unit-bid) and (S + 1/2)-th price auction (price is the average of S-th and (S + 1)-st).
This decomposition is not obvious from (22), but it accounts for the fact that raising one's bid on unit q may raise the price paid on the first q − 1 units; see the working-paper version for a derivation. Note that, unlike in the discriminatory auction, the marginal effect of raising bidder i's q-th unit-bid on his expected payoff depends on the joint distribution of (s i,q−1 ,s i,q ). To see why, observe that bidder i's q-th unit-bid sets the price only wheñ As before, Assumption 2 implies that these "unit-payoff functions" are locally differen-
Partial identification. All of the results of Section 3 apply to the uniform-price auction without further modification, once we substitute uniform-price auction payoffs for discriminatory auction payoffs in the formulae. Operationally, this amounts to computing the "indifference levels" v * U i,X (b i ) for the uniform-price auction (see Definition 3). In particular, for each quantity q, (24) implies
(Indifference levels v * U i,X (b i ) for each subset X ⊂ {1, ..., S} can be similarly computed.)
Testable restrictions. For each q 1 ≤ q 2 , we can derive a set of testable restrictions in the uniform-price auction by repeating the argument in Section 4 that applied to the discriminatory auction. For example, consider the incremental profit expressions (13, 14) associated with a pair of upward and downward deviations. To apply to the uniform-price auction, we need only modify the terms corresponding to the effect of each deviation on (14)). For the rest of the derivation of inequality restriction (18), these payment-related terms can be simply carried through, to arrive at a corresponding inequality restriction for the uniform-price auction. (I omit the details since they involve fairly complex formulae that offer little additional insight.)
However, a significant difference arises when it comes to implementing the tests associated with these restrictions. The reason is that, to evaluate the price effect of raising bidder i's bid on quantity q, the econometrician must estimate probabilities associated with the joint distribution of (s i,q−1 ,s i,q ). (In the discriminatory auction, the econometrician must only estimate probabilities associated with the marginal distribution ofs i,q .) For example, to implement a test of the single restriction in the uniform-price auction that corresponds to the single restriction (21) in the discriminatory auction, the econometrician must determine the likelihood that bidder i's residual inverse supply (i)s i,q 1 −1 is greater than b + ∆, in independent. All of bidder 1's bids can be easily rationalized: each bid b 1 ∈ supp(b i ) is a best response iff v 1 = b 1 . We shall focus on bidder 2.
The first part of Proposition 1, characterizing V Counterfactual: should the units be bundled? Even though bidder 2's values are not point identified, we can conduct meaningful policy counterfactual analysis. For example, could the auctioneer increase expected revenue by bundling the units together and selling the bundle using a second-price auction? (The fact that bidder 2 has increasing marginal values is suggestive that bundling may increase revenue, since bidder 2 will no longer face the "exposure problem" of sometimes winning only one unit.)
To perform this counterfactual experiment, we need to know the distribution of each bidder's value for the bundle, i.e.ṽ 1,1 +ṽ 1,2 andṽ 2,1 +ṽ 2,2 . Recall that we have inferred bidder 1's valueṽ 1 =b 1 . This identifies the distribution ofṽ 1,1 +ṽ 1,2 . However, since bidder 2's value is not point identified, there are many possible value distributions consistent with his distribution of bids. Nonetheless, our characterization of the sets V BR i (b i ) provide upper and lower bounds onṽ 2,1 +ṽ 2,2 conditional on each bidb i , these bounds being realized at either end-point of the line-segment V BR 2 (b 2 ) described in Proposition 1:
This allows us to identify the "highest" and the "lowest" value distributions that could generate the observed bids in equilibrium, and hence to compute upper and lower bounds for expected revenue in the counter-factual. In particular, expected revenue in the secondprice auction when the units are bundled will be at least about .955 and at most about .99.
11
In the status quo, expected revenue is only .83. Thus, the auctioneer can raise revenue by 11 Spreadsheets that implement these computations are available from the author and posted at www.mit.edu/˜mcadams. An upward deviation at some q ∈ Q(b) is profitable unless
By (2) and (7),
can be re-written as
. Thus, we may re-write (26) as
. Note that 
To complete the proof, note that the constants {c q } defined here coincide with the constants defined in Theorem 1. Namely, we can express values as in Theorem 1: 
, bidder i must strictly prefer to deviate by slightly raising his price on all units in [min Q(b i,x ), x], a contradiction. We conclude
Part II: v i,q ≤ min x=1,...,qvi,x (b i ) and v i,q ≥ max x=q,...,Svi,x (b i ). As in Part I, to prove
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that v i,x >v i,x (b i ) for some x ≤ q. By NIMV and the fact that
is increasing in v i,y for all y,
Next, let z(x) = arg max
At the same time,
since otherwise bidder i would strictly prefer to deviate by raising his price on all quantities
Combining (10, 30, 31, 32, 33) , we conclude that
This contradicts the assumption that v i ∈ V This completes the proof of Theorem 2(a).
Part III: tightness of bounds. Define v i of Theorem 2(b) as follows:
Part III-a: non-increasing marginal values. Let Q(b) be any (non-empty) step of quantities all bid at price b.
As can be easily checked, (34, 35, 36) 
for all x. (This set of feasible local deviations forms a "basis" for all feasible local deviations.
Namely, if any feasible local deviation is profitable, then one of these deviations must be profitable.) There are two cases to consider. This completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2.
Step 1 Step 2 This completes the proof.
